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The global geopolitical and science landscape is undergoing its most profound transformation since the Cold War ¨C but the day-to-day headlines often obscure the bigger picture. This is not a simplistic narrative of America¡¯s scientific withdrawal from the world stage, but rather a strategic recalibration of its global presence ¨C one so unfamiliar that it appears irrational to many observers. It will lead to a fundamental restructuring of how knowledge, talent and innovation flow around the world.

America¡¯s scientific and economic global dominance was built on openness ¨C welcoming talent, fostering collaboration and projecting intellectual leadership. Post-war investments in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Nasa) and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Darpa) created a trilateral engine of academia, government and industry that competitors could not replicate.

This drew talented scientists and entrepreneurs from around the world; by 2020, immigrants had founded 55 per cent of US billion-dollar startups. And of America¡¯s 420 Nobel prizewinners, 36 per cent were immigrants.

Now, Trump is systematically dismantling this legacy. Visa constraints, tariffs and research funding cuts are pushing away international talent and allies. According to Nafsa, the Association of International Educators, international students and scholars have had their visas revoked or their records terminated since mid-March, with no discernible pattern in the nationalities targeted. The American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) projects that the number .

According to Nafsa, these policies have had a huge impact on international enrolment. ¡°Interest in US postgraduate education has plunged 40 per cent since January 2025,¡± the body reports, ¡°while there is rising interest in Germany, France and China as a study destination.¡±

Yet America¡¯s global dominance of science and higher education was unravelling well before the Trump administration, with massive investments in higher education and science by China and ¡°excellence initiatives¡± in several other countries.

Analysis of official data by education researchers suggests that international enrolment in US higher education dropped by?more than 130,000 students (11 per cent) between March 2024 and March 2025. And between 2010 and 2021, nearly 20,000 scientists of Chinese descent left America, with the proportion returning to China rising from 48 to 67 per cent.

Meanwhile, as America¡¯s doors narrow for international talent, middle powers have been strategically positioning themselves to capture displaced researchers and students. France¡¯s Talent Passport programme, which actively recruits researchers in strategic fields like artificial intelligence, has recently been supplemented by a , operated by the French National Research Agency.

Norway has just launched an with the express intention of luring people from the US; a recent reveals that 75 per cent of US scientists who responded are considering leaving the country following the Trump administration¡¯s research funding cuts and mass layoffs, with Europe and Canada being the preferred alternatives.

Canada¡¯s Tech Talent Strategy courts US-based international talent with streamlined work permits, and the country?is also top of The Economist¡¯s ¡°footloose index¡± of desirable countries for graduates, with the potential to gain 13 million skilled graduates if immigration barriers were removed. Australia is second, while the US has fallen to third.

The exodus of talent is likely to be accelerated by America¡¯s dismantling of its research infrastructure. The National Science Foundation (NSF), cornerstone of the country¡¯s innovation ecosystem, has already cancelled many grants that fall foul of White House edicts on topics such as DEI and climate change and the administration proposing to slash its annual funding from . NSF director Sethuraman Panchanathan has described these potential cuts as ¡°devastating¡± and ¡°a national security issue¡±.

The administration is also reportedly planning to by 40 per cent.

At the same time, there is fear and resentment among foreign scholars about participating in conferences, seminars and research projects in the US. Some governments now warn their citizens to be aware that comments on social media or their own electronic devices may jeopardise US entry. Similarly concerning is the practice of asking scholars to justify their funding sources and requiring them to complete questionnaires about various issues, including their connections to China.

With its tariffs of up to 145 per cent imposed on Chinese goods and controls on exporting strategic materials to China, the US appears headed toward confrontation with China, despite history¡¯s warning that wars ¨C military or economic ¨C start easily but end with difficulty. This will inevitably have a profound impact on academic collaboration between the two nations. US-China co-authored STEM papers already declined by 15 per cent between 2020 and 2022, as previous decoupling policies took effect.

The risk is that research becomes more Balkanised, with collaboration siloed into competing geopolitical blocs ¨C at a time when the existential challenges humanity faces demand maximal transnational scientific cooperation. Other nations, such as South Korea, Singapore and Brazil, are strategically positioning themselves as neutral collaboration zones, but it won¡¯t be enough to prevent stalled progress on challenges such as climate destabilisation, pandemic prevention and AI governance.

Reversing this trajectory requires the Trump administration to reject the false dichotomy between national security and scientific openness ¨C a stance advocated by over 1,900 National Academies members in a .

If that doesn¡¯t happen, leading American universities will have to try to develop new partnerships and satellite presences abroad, much as businesses establish foreign subsidiaries to navigate protectionist barriers. They will have to learn to exist in a world where their historical advantages of prestige, resources and centrality to global knowledge networks are rapidly eroding.

?is a professor of the practice in the department of educational leadership and higher education at Boston College;? and are professors emeritus in the Center for International Higher Education at Boston College.